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Rarely have notable workers in philosophy and in literary theory
interacted so intensely as in the period of German letters that spanned
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The case of Johann Fichte and Friedrich Schelling is especially
interesting, since each of them imagined they were working to solidify
a common position that was the systematic fruit of all of Kant’s labors
on transcendental idealism, and yet they struggled, in almost Oedipal
fashion, for leadership of the movement. One can look to the
Fichte-Schelling Correspondence for the personal details of the fraught
relationship, but to answer the serious philosophical question of the
“one difference” that separates the two thinkers, one had best look to
the texts the two thinkers published or penned in the years 1800–02:
Fichte’s Vocation of Man along with new versions of the
Wissenschaftslehre attempted in 1800 and 1801–02 and Schelling’s
System of Transcendental Idealism along with two pieces published in
his Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, the General Deduction of the
Dynamic Process and the Presentation of My System. This chapter will
focus on the System of Transcendental Idealism1 and the Vocation of
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Man,2 with occasional reference to the points of conflict that emerge
between the two thinkers in the Correspondence.3 As the title
indicates, the works contrast broadly as essays in systematic
philosophy based in theory of knowledge (or the Kantian theoretical
philosophy) and in practical philosophy (or Kantian “metaphysics of
morals”).
We shall argue that Fichte’s project of illuminating the stance of
human agency and his frank appeal to the immediacy of individual
self-hood is currently philosophically more compelling than the
systematization of human cognition that Schelling achieves in
abstraction from the lived subjectivity of the individual human agent,
partly in casting purposes ahead of herself, partly in obedience to the
moral “summons” symbolized by the presence of other embodied
agents.
Fichte’s departure from Jena in June 1799 in the wake of the
“Atheism Controversy” disrupted the forces of transcendental idealism
which for a decade had been concentrated in that small university
town,4 and after Jacobi publicly denounced the Wissenschaftslehre as
nihilism5 and Kant publicly disavowed its connection with
transcendental idealism,6 plans with various publishers that involved
both the idealist philosophers and the thinker-critics of the romantic
circle were quickly hatched. Critical philosophy needed to show a
united face and catch the edge of the cultural currents swirling in the
times just before the turn of the century. A bewildering variety of
these plans are documented in the letters that passed between
Fichte in Berlin and Schelling in Jena in 1800, as well as political
schemes (and personal affronts) over who was to lead the new
institute and who was to review new developments in the sciences and
the arts.
But the Fichte-Schelling Correspondence broaches difficult
philosophical tensions as well, hidden under the courtesies of
exchanging copies of publications and asking for opinions of newly
published works. Schelling ordered his publisher to send Fichte a
vellum copy of the System of Transcendental Idealism when it was
published in the spring of 1800, but it did not arrive until November 15
(FSB, 105). Four days later, Schelling received a copy of The Vocation
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of Man (FSB, 113). Fichte made a few pages of notes on Schelling’s
system7 and began to get quite actively engaged in a debate with its
author on the place of a philosophy of nature within idealism. Schelling
does not explicitly refer to the Vocation for a nearly a year, and then
his sole remark on the essay is to disparage the way it ultimately
relocated the ground of consciousness beyond the reach of philosophy,
in the realm of faith: there is simply no room for faith in philosophy
(FSB, 135). The polite exchange of copies, otherwise the sign of
friendship, really was the drawing of battle lines: one version of
idealism could not see there was much for idealism to do with nature—
except to move away from it; another found no sense in locating the
topic of discussion far beyond what theoretical intellect could make of
the deliverances of the sense.

Faith, Interest, and the “Intellectual World”
Because Fichte’s disavows any systematic or “scientific” intent
for The Vocation of Man and hopes to work from the standpoint of
natural consciousness in a personal and rhetorical way, it is difficult to
discern the three-part structure of the argument before it unfolds and
to precisely locate the new terminology of “faith,” “interest,” and the
“supernatural” (überirdische) or “intellectual” world.
Let us first consider the terminology of the third book. Fichte’s
argument moves within a broad context of phenomena that we can
together call interest. In the most basic cases, biologically embedded
human needs such as hunger, hydration, human company, shelter
against the elements, and security against predators (animal or
human) are best met, not dismissed skeptically. Hunger commands,
and the same can be said for social needs such as the rearing of
children and the protection of the infirm and aged. Fichte’s argument
moves freely among these affectively announced imperatives, and the
fluidity of such reference reminds the reader that human action has
the structure of bidding or command.
Confronted with the problem of skepticism’s challenge to the
validity of the “natural urge” to take one’s presentations as caused by
external objects to which they refer, Fichte argues that it is not an
arbitrary decision whether to treat one’s feeling and presentations as
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merely one’s states of consciousness or whether to accord them a
reality—even if theoretical philosophy (epistemology) is totally unable
to provide a satisfactory account of the presumed causal link between
“outside” and “inside.” Because one is primarily an actor or an agent
embedded in a situation, the standpoint of ordinary consciousness
inclines toward a “practical realism”: “If we all have the ability and
urge to go beyond our first natural view, then why do so few go
beyond it...? It is not reasons, for there are none that can do it. Rather
it is their interest in a reality they want to produce—the good person
simply to produce it; the common sensuous person to enjoy it” (VM,
73; BM, 258–59).
The standpoint of activity is native to human consciousness—
and my word native implies that in one sense it is found, or comes
along with the situated or intentional aspect of consciousness, and in
another sense that, once consciousness has been socially developed or
educated, it is voluntarily adopted and exercised both for its own sake
and for the consequences that action brings. Natural—by which Fichte
means practical, not theoretical—consciousness is interested or
inclined. It is driven by natural urges and finds itself confronted with
concepts that are not mere pictures, but which prompt an independent
activity that realizes them. Interest begets purposes and human
consciousness is naturally purposive, thinks Fichte. This urge to realize
one’s purposes through action points to an ultimate situation where
consciousness becomes independent, self-active and self-realizing.
This urge, which is felt or experienced, not conceived, connects me to
a represented situation which is the aim or goal of my activity. “I think
this real power to act, but I do not think it up. The immediate feeling
of my drive to independent activity is behind this thought. Thought
does nothing more than represent this feeling and take it up into its
own form, the form of thought” (VM, 69; BM, 255).
The familiar stance of deontological ethics: Ought implies can,
points to the wider situation of human agency. That I am impelled by a
natural drive, inclined by a personal or social goal, and inspired or
commanded by an ideal somehow beyond my immediate well-being
implies there is a natural bridge between interest, faith, and the
mobilization of specific activity or will. “No one who is alive can part
with this interest nor with the faith which this interest brings with it.
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We are all born in faith. Whoever is blind in this regard will blindly
follow its secret and irresistible prompting. Whoever can see will follow
with open eyes, and will believe because he wants to believe” (VM, 73;
BM, 259).
The third book of the discussion introduces faith as the
antithesis of the disheartenment and doubt produced by the skeptical
probing of first realistic, then idealistic constructs of epistemology.8
So a first sense of “faith” is the renewed sense of self and the validity
of action that the switch from the theoretical to the practical stance
effects. “[I]t is not these [empty images of things supposedly existing
outside ourselves] but the necessary belief in our freedom and
strength, in the reality of our acting. . . that justifies all consciousness
of a reality existing outside of us—a consciousness which itself is only
a faith since it is based on faith, but a faith that necessarily follows
from consciousness” (VM, 79; BM, 264). A second sense of ‘faith’ is
belief in the efficacy of rational action creating not only a better, but a
utopian world: “[T]hat purpose has got to be achieved. Oh, it is
achievable in life and through life, for reason commands me to live.
It is achievable, for—I am” (VM, 91; BM, 276).
Only in the third and fourth sections of the third book does
“faith” take on any connotation of a belief that is not directly
supported by reason. The third part deploys a transcendental
argument, based on the Kantian presupposition that purposive
behavior or agency is not the mere production of worldly
consequences, but aims at efficacy in a purely rational order—or the
cultivation of will for sake of will. Impulse, interest, and purpose are all
gradations of rational activity that culminate in morality, or obedience
to the command of reason. On this point, we note that the Kantian
cannot refute a utilitarian or neo-Darwinian understanding of morality;
the parties can only disagree. But if the Kantian presupposition is
granted, then Fichte can argue
1. that obedient (lawful) willing is commanded of me for its own
sake,
2. that this demand is the source of everything rational in me, in
particular my freedom, and
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3. therefore, it is reasonable to believe in a supersensible, eternal
world, where the impulse to improve and perfect my existence
is realized, rather than frustrated (VM, 101; BM, 286–97).
Belief in the efficacy of my will is “faith,” but hardly a Jacobian
salto mortale—or an invitation to believe twenty-three incredible
things before breakfast, as one Anglican divine famously said. It is a
natural belief based on arguable premises.
The fourth part of the discussion, however, moves beyond the
Kantian religion of morality Fichte previously espoused in his 1798
On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, where
he argued from the premise: “I myself, along with my necessary goal,
constitute what is supersensible” (SW V, 181; IWL, 147), to a
terminological, and effectively nontheistic, if not atheistic,
identification of God with the moral order: “The living and efficaciously
acting moral order is itself God. We require no other God, nor can we
grasp another” (SW V, 186; IWL, 131). In 1800, evidently another
God is required, even if that principle is not quite conceivable. Fichte
now speaks of an “infinite will’ that is the union and mediation of all
finite wills, that perceives each finite will, and of a “God” that is “the
union and direct interaction of a number of autonomous independent
wills with each other” (VM, 107–109; BM, 293). This union of wills is
an open secret that lies before us in this present life, asserts Fichte; it
does lie before us, unnoticed as Fichte claims, if what is meant is the
interaction of diverse agents or the making-way for one another that is
demanded by morality (and to some extent fulfilled in the social and
legal realms). The involvement of a divine agency is not so plainly
discernible.
Fichte goes on to ascribe the conventional predicate of “creator”
to this infinite will, but this deity creates monadologically, “in the only
way it can be and in which alone a creation is required: in finite
reason” (VM, 110; BM, 296). This remark is cryptic as it stands; in the
Correspondence, Fichte speaks more technically of the principle of the
intellectual world as
an inconceivable real ground of the separation of individuals and
the ideal link of all of them = God. (This is what I call the
intelligible world.) This final synthesis is the highest. If you wish
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to give the name “being,” indeed absolute being, to whatever
still remains impenetrable to this view, then God is pure being.
Notwithstanding, in itself this being is not some kind of
compression, but it is absolute agility, pure transparency, light,
but not the light that reflects from bodies. It is only the latter
for finite reason: it is accordingly only a being for finite reason,
not in itself (FSB, 129).9
Fichte works out this line of speculation at some length in the
1801–02 Wissenschaftslehre.10 It is, however, only of such
speculations as are found in the fourth section of the final book of
Vocation that Schelling’s complaint, voiced late in the Correspondence,
could apply, to wit, that it relocates the ground of knowing beyond
knowing (which ought to be an embarrassment for Wissenschaftslehre
or “Science of Knowing”), that there is as little place for “faith” in
philosophy as there is in geometry, and that this whole line of
speculation considerably alters Fichte’s whole philosophy, which
previously had simply identified “God” and the moral order (FSB, 135).
We are now in a position to approach the question of the overall
structure of The Vocation of Man. I have approached the work
backward, starting with the resolution of the dialectical perplexities in
Book Three in order to avoid unnecessary entanglement in the
discouraging and/or skeptical epistemological investigations of the first
two books—a strategy that parallels informed attempts to read Fichte’s
Grundlage des gesamten Wissenschaftslehre.
At some distance from the text, it is possible to identify Fichte’s
interlocutors or “targets” in the first two sections.
It is fairly easy to see that the target of Book One, with its
realistic account of knowledge that highlights the principle of causality
and which ends by undermining any authentic sense of freedom, is an
idealized Spinoza. When the analysis of sensation, thought, and action
ends in an overwhelming causal determinism coming from the outside,
as it were, the writer laments: “I don’t act at all, but nature acts in
me. I cannot will the intention of making something of myself other
than what I am determined to be by nature, for I don’t make myself at
all, but nature makes me and whatever I become” (VM, 19; BM, 207).
This is perhaps a reprise of the crushing sarcasm of the Earth Spirit’s
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reply to Faust’s übermenschlich pretensions in the opening scene of
Goethe’s Faust, Part I.11 Or perhaps it is a reflection of Fichte’s worries
about the direction of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie that get expressed
repeatedly in the Correspondence.
A second attempt is made in the first book to overcome the
paralysis of determinism by hypothetically elaborating a “system of
freedom,” where the wishes of the heart—“I want to love. I want to
lose myself in taking an interest [Theilname], I want to be glad and be
sad. For me the highest object of this interest [Theilname] is myself”
(VM, 24; BM, 212)—are skeptically undercut again by the suspicion
that this love and “interest” (or self-absorption), so vividly
experienced, is but itself a product of the forces of nature. Unless
affect, urge, and drive are connected to a standpoint where genuine
independence and self-activity are achieved (the moral stance of
Book Three), passion and interest itself is subject to Spinozistic causal
dissection as the “miserable worm’s” self-deception.
The target of Book Two is more mysterious. Fichte clearly
presents a transcendental analysis of cognition, but lacking the anchor
of “the primacy of the practical” that Kant added to his Transcendental
Idealism, idealistic epistemology transform the contents of
consciousness into the stuff of dreams—the line of argument deployed
against idealism by later anti-Kantians such as Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, but used in different form in Fichte’s
lifetime against Wissenschaftslehre by Reinhold, Schelling, and Hegel:
the charge that Wisenschaftslehre is mere logic, not philosophy.12
There are three phases of the idealistic analysis of cognition
presented in Book Two. In the first phase, an inspection of
consciousness is seen to reveal an essential togetherness of
self-consciousness and the object of consciousness, but since there is
no sensation or object of consciousness without self-consciousness,
the latter is judged to be condition of the former. The object is given in
self-consciousness, but there is no consciousness of the production of
the object (VM, 40–41; BM, 228–29). Secondly, in the natural stance
of theoretical consciousness, the object of consciousness is imputed to
the workings of an external object upon consciousness, with the
connection between the two furnished by the principle of causality.
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But external objects can never be observed in their “externality,” nor
is causality directly experienced. Both the supposedly external object
and the linking causal relation are thought, and what one is conscious
of is not the so-called external object, but the positing of an object
according to an inner law of thought (VM, 45; BM, 233). The mere
theoretical idealist concludes, then, that all knowledge is knowledge of
oneself alone. Finally, the externality of the imputed objected is
explained through intuition—a projection of an internal state outward
or an out-seeing that is accompanied by self-consciousness or
in-seeing (VM, 51; BM, 238). The object is produced in consciousness
unconsciously or without consciousness of its production through a
threefold process of intuition, which places the object in one’s
consciousness as outside of consciousness, thought, which imputes a
causal relationship between “outside” and “inside,” and a third stage of
synthesis, which hides the above-mentioned two mechanisms (VM,
56–57; BM, 244–45). That this march of thought is summarized as:
the consciousness of the thing outside of us is absolutely nothing more
than the product of our own presentative capacity (VM, 59; BM, 236),
leads me to conclude that Reinhold is object of Fichte’s concern in this
second book. But closer to our concerns here is the similarity of this
analysis to the dialectic of hidden or unconscious production,
projection, and eventual entry-into-consciousness that is the motor of
Schelling’s genetic deduction in the System of Transcendental
Idealism. It lends weight to Fichte’s charge, repeated often to
Schelling in the Correspondence (and to others outside of the
presumed perimeter of confidentiality that the letters adopted) that
Schelling never understood transcendental idealism.13

The Odyssey of Consciousness
When Schelling turned from his explorations of the possibility of
an idealistic philosophy of nature in the years 1797 to 1799 and
attempted a grand work of consolidation, he actually believed that
philosophy had two independent parts, transcendental philosophy and
natural philosophy, each of which functioned adequately on its own,
but together calling for the unification of a “grand theory.” The first
thing Fichte notices when he reads the 1800 System of Transcendental
Idealism, arguably Schelling’s most polished piece of reasoning, is that
its two major parts do not fit together or, much worse, that unification

Fichte’s Vocation of Man, Chapter 15 (2013): pg. 255-272. Publisher's Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press.

9

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

of nature and consciousness is achieved solely on naturalistic grounds:
“His classification of philosophy into two fundamental sciences.—I
assert: nature as object is only thought by you: it only exists to the
extent that you think it.”14 Fichte has good reason to be worried, for
the public perceived the two philosophers to hold a roughly common
position, and the frankly abstractive, conceptual methodology of the
system, articulated with little reference to the I’s standpoint of agility,
self-activity or self-constitution—now cryptically referred to by Fichte
as a Grundreflex—ignored the most fundamental aspect of
Wissenschaftslehre, that I know when I know, and thus tended to
perpetuate the fundamental misreading of transcendental idealism that
the provisional 1794–95 Grundlage des gesamtem Wissenschaftslhre
seemed to invite, namely, that it was all about some ghostly
disembodied absolute I that subsisted outside personal consciousness.
Argues Fichte (in his personal notes): “If we only knew (about objects)
without knowing in turn that we know them, then transcendental
idealism would not be possible at all. And (knowingly) this standpoint
is the standpoint of the philosophy of nature; unknowingly, it is the
standpoint of dogmatism.”15
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explore the
System of Transcendental Idealism; our discussion will be limited to:
(1) its starting point and methodology; (2) the way it embeds the
genetic account of intelligence in the stages of nature’s development;
and (3) the way its only approach to an account of “spirit” or
embodied consciousness is an objectified one, painted on the large
canvases of social philosophy, philosophy of history, and aesthetic
creation—rather than the miniature frames Fichte preferred of personal
morality, life in the historically given state, and religion.16
(1) The most striking feature of Schelling’s method in the
System is its abstract and Reinholdean cast. Schelling’s knowledge of
Wissenschaftslehre was limited to its first, quasi-foundational
presentation in the 1794–95 Grundlage, and to the rather wooden
analysis of presentation or the basic item of consciousness as a
synthesis of opposite, a subjective and an objective element. That I
know when I know, that I am given to myself in self-consciousness,
and the presentation is originated in my consciousness are features
that are absent in Schelling’s analysis, or at best underappreciated.
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While for Fichte in the second Jena system, “intellectual intuition”
means that the I can at least symbolically access the constitutive or
active I in reverting upon itself, “intellectual intuition” is for Schelling
from the very start a mysterious process of abstracting from lived
subjectivity and only thereby gaining access to the I on its productive
or constitutive level.
At the natural level, self-consciousness is analogous to the eye:
“Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but
it casts its light ahead only, not behind” (SI, 47; Tr., 18). Unable to
see itself unless it alters the natural situation, the philosopher
arbitrarily contrives to get self-consciousness to produce itself, in
laboratory conditions as it were, and in this experiment the I becomes
an object for itself in the act of producing itself. This implies that.
1. the I is originally an object only for itself, and
2. in becoming an object for us, it become what it originally is not,
viz., something objective, and
3. therefore, its self-production in transcendental philosophy
essentially involves a self-limitation (SI, 70–71; Tr., 36).
To limit itself, the I must oppose something to itself, and this
opens up a series of dialectical moves whereby the I appears to itself
(and the philosopher-experimenters in attendance) as finite in its
infinitude, objective in its subjectivity, limited in its limitlessness, and
so forth. Having induced that which is absolutely nonobjective to
become objective, self-consciousness enters into a permanent duality
of acting and intuiting, or producing and reflecting. “Through this
constant double activity of producing and intuiting, something is to
become an object, which is otherwise not reflected by anything at all”
(SI, 41; Tr., 13). In its limited and genetically exhibited form, the I
seems to be in perpetual duplicity, first a producing, then a
subsequent intuiting; this is the price one must pay for having the
essentially nonobjective projected onto the objective, or that which is
essentially self-intuition (or intellectual intuition) become visible to
finite subjects. But the in-itself character of the I, that it is free and
self-originating, is that it is intellectual intuition (SI, 58–59; Tr., 27);
only the whole series of finite forms of consciousness, produced in the
incessant shuffling from production to intuition in a specific form, then
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back to production again, approximates the I in itself. The I is
essentially not a thing, but philosophy performs the trick of turning it
into a thing by generating the series of all possible kinds of things, all
possible forms of objectivity.
(2) The elaboration of the philosophy of nature is the
System’s most ingenious and most technical feature, for the lopsided
dialectical back and forth between productivity and product (intuition)
enables Schelling to parallel the deduction of the phases of intelligence
with the articulation of the successive levels (Potenzen) of nature.
Schelling’s most illuminating comments about the relationship between
transcendental idealism and the philosophy of nature can be found in
the latter half of the 1800 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process.
A basic point that needs to be appreciated by post-Darwinian readers
is that nature traverses the ladder of its successive stages
speculatively, or in philosophical reflection, not actually or historically,
and the same holds for the corresponding phases of intelligence.
All phases of nature coexist simultaneously, as do all moments of
intelligence—sensation or qualities, intuition, and the various forms of
understanding.17 Both the major parts of transcendental idealism,
philosophy of nature and transcendental philosopher proper, are
exercises in Platonic anamnesis, as it were—philosophical recoveries or
“recollections” of the ideas of nature and intelligence. The one
philosophizing finds his or her self-consciousness already existing in
the highest potency, but a flatfooted idealism that straightaway makes
reason the sole intention of nature is mistaken in this anthropomorphic
line of thought, for it is only in putting aside subjectivity and learning
to think objectively or purely theoretically that the philosopher can
effect this philosophical recovery—just as in done in the System of
Transcendental Idealism (DP, § 63, 164). In this process, however, the
so-called dead nature of Newtonian physics disappears, and nature’s
observed qualities are seen to be sensations, its “matters” or corporeal
bodies intuitions, and organic nature as itself intelligence (DP, § 63,
164–65).
There are three general phases or epochs in the System’s
construction of nature-or-intelligence: (1) from original sensation to
productive intuition, (2) from productive intuition to reflection, and (3)
from reflection to the act of will. The first epoch is emblematic of the
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whole deduction. The I limits itself or objectifies itself in order to
appear in consciousness; its self-construction is, for the observer, a
transition to duality, from pure subject to subject-and-object (SI, 93;
Tr., 51). This happens by means of the I’s positing a limitation, which
limitation, however, since it is a spontaneous act of the I, is the
establishment of a boundary that is not a boundary, or an activity on
both sides of the boundary. The I appears to itself as limited or
determined in sensation, which in reality is nothing but the sensing
itself. “Now if the I always senses only its own suspended activity, the
sensed is nothing distinct from the I, a fact to which ordinary
philosophical parlance has already given expression, in that it speaks
of the sensed as something purely subjective” (SI, 98; Tr., 56).18 The I
does not just have sensations, however, but has sensations of bodies
or things. This occurs because its intuition (sensation) is accompanied
by an intuition of intuition; the sensation becomes the matter of
“productive intuition,” and the I’s object becomes matter (SI, 121; Tr.,
72). This productive activity, in turn, appears to the I as two activities,
one imaging and one producing; their union or synthesis, that which
appears to consciousness, is the awareness of matter and mind: “In
the first epoch of self-consciousness we could distinguish three acts,
and these seem to reappear in the three forces of matter and in the
three stages of its construction. These…give us three dimensions of
matter, and these latter, three levels in the dynamic process [gravity,
magnetism, and electricity]” (SI, 146; Tr., 90). The two subsequent
epochs of theoretical philosophy have a more idealistic cast, the
second being the elaboration of the forms of thought (Kant’s
categories), and the third the forms of relation (schematism) and
judgment. Theoretical philosophy culminates in the uncovering of
“transcendental abstraction,” the activity whereby space, time, the
putative relations of substance and causality that link discrete bodies,
and so forth, are all separated out in experience and become capable
of philosophical (transcendental) analysis for the philosopher who
observes the process of evolution that empirical abstraction has
facilitated (SI, 223; Tr., 149–50). By the same token, the freedom of
transcendental abstraction allows those observing consciousness to
transit to the order of practical reason or will, where the active
character of the original I first becomes apparent to itself.
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(3) Because Schelling believed that intellectual intuition, both in
the original I and in the philosopher-observer recovering its activity in
philosophical reflection, involves surrender of subjectivity or moving to
an impersonal point of view, the System’s practical philosophy takes
an objective (or collective) approach to the life of the mind and largely
leaves the individual agent behind. In this, it prefigures Schelling’s
so-called system of identity and Hegel’s “objective idealism.” The
author warns the reader at the start that what is at issue in this
section is not a peculiar moral philosophy commended to any singular
agent, but a transcendental reflection on the thinkability of moral
concepts as such, conducted at the highest level of generality (SI,
230; Tr., 155).
The practical point of view entails an “absolute abstraction” from
the previous series of acts and the phenomena they produced, for
while theoretical consciousness is always involved with objectivity and
necessarily takes the shape of subject-objectivity, practical
consciousness or will demands pure self-determination—activity that is
only involved with objectivity to the extent that future or
not-yet-existent states are conceived which the will strives to realize.
That I can act at all (here Schelling is quite in concurrence with Fichte)
means that I am not necessitated to act in any specific way by any
worldly state or situation, or that, to some extent, I am free to act as I
choose or will. In theoretical philosophy, the I’s productivity remained
hidden from itself; it could intuit itself as produced, as an organic
body, for instance, but the I could never there achieve self-intuition.
Only in willing is the I raised to a higher power and enabled to intuit its
essential activity (SI, 231–32; Tr., 156). Thus, the autonomy that
Kant places at the summit of moral philosophy is seen to be the
principle of all transcendental idealism (SI, 233; Tr., 157).
From these, its opening moves, it is easy to see how the
practical part of the System of Transcendental Idealism unfolds,
namely, along familiar Kantian and Fichtean lines that prize the
autonomy of the individual inside a context of plural agents mutually
respecting one another’s freedom, the drift of history to replace
hegemony and the tyranny of traditionally favored individuals,
genders, and ethnicities with egalitarian or cosmopolitan societies, and
the fostering of intellectual disciplines where teleological ideas or
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forecasts lead the progress of science, not just masses of
contingencies and discrete observations. Schelling introduces a novel
point in making the exercise of will the I’s entry into time, the moment
of absolute abstraction, or the separation of inner sense from outer;
only when the I acts is it for itself, and only when it is for itself in a
situation of ever-changing and lapsing actuality is it called upon to act
concretely (SI, 231; Tr., 155–56). He follows Fichte’s social and legal
philosophy of the late Jena years in making the confrontation of my
will with the wills of other embodied subjects in a social-legal setting
the real factical “check” that individualizes my consciousness and
concretely locates a sphere of activity for me here and now. The Other
is the limit of my freedom not only in a general or moral sense; the
pressure of other wills determines my situation and in fact
individualizes my activity; unless I were hemmed in by other wills, my
sphere of activity would be infinite and embrace all possibility. Only
the specific situation of other agents acting against my will gives my
will a specific object (SI, 244–45; Tr., 166).
The real novelty of the 1800 System comes in its final section,
where the absolute self-activity of the practical stance is merged with
the blind productivity of the theoretical in a consideration of aesthetic
creativity and the way the produced work of art displays an infinity of
meaning. Presumably, Schelling benefited from discussions with the
Jena romantics in this regard, although the general outline of his
treatment is inherited from Kant. What is new and surprising in
Schelling’s treatment is the emphasis on the work, not the creator’s
intent or state of mind. If one considers the artist’s freedom, then
every work of art is the one absolute work, for the work indefinitely
conveys endless meanings and thus succeeds in doing what nature
cannot do—displaying the infinite activity of the I (SI, 327; Tr., 231).
This is a fruitful, almost contemporary approach to aesthetics, since it
frees artistic creativity from any fetters of conventional or traditional
forms, makes utterly no judgments about how nature and its stuff is
imbued with human meaning in a particular work or form of art, and
points to an essential feature that differentiates the aesthetic work
from the utilitarian or “craft” object—a surplus of meaning due to an
overdetermination of the determinate (in Schelling’s language, a
display of the infinite within the finite). In the work of art, the absolute
activity of the practical perspective is merged with the
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productive-but-hidden character of theoretical or object-producing
consciousness, and the whole aspect of productivity is concretized for
intuition—a necessarily polyvalent intuition wherein many subjects will
sense and understand many different things. Art is the display of
nature’s I:
What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent in a
mysterious and wonderful script. Yet the riddle could reveal
itself, were we to recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, which,
marvelously deluded, seeks itself and in seeking flies from itself;
for through the world of sense there glimmers—as if through
words, the meaning—as if through dissolving mists the land of
phantasy for which we search. (SI, 328; Tr., 232)19

The Difference—If Not the Primacy—of the
Practical
The exchange of texts—our major texts—between Schelling and
Fichte in November 1800 did not settle matters between the two. The
Correspondence goes on for another fourteen months with neither
author quite able to pin-point the “one difference” that separates the
two, and when the exchange breaks off, the works each writes in 1802
continue to reflect the abortive private negotiations the letters
contained. In Bruno, Schelling echoes the judgment of his new
colleague Hegel that Fichte’s idealism is essentially trapped inside the
subjective perspective and hence unable to attain the broader
standpoint of absolute (or “objective”) idealism.20 Fichte’s Darstellung
des Wissenschaftslehre (1801–02) not only expands the “infinite will”
of the Vocation of Man or the “pure being” of the letters into a “system
of the intelligible world,” it contains an extensive critique of Schelling’s
new system of identity that insists that philosophy must begin in
freedom to end with freedom, something no “new Spinozism” or
treatment that begins with mere being can achieve.21 The perplexity
Fichte encountered when he read the System of Transcendental
Idealism persists: “Am I more correct in saying what I say, or is he in
saying what he says? Will we ever comprehend each other?” (LS, 414;
PRFS 120).
On several scores, the contest between Fichte and Schelling
must be scored a draw: Each achieves, to a remarkable degree, the
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ideal of a philosophical system that comprehends at least some of the
more important phenomena of human existence; the fact that Fichte’s
ends with a philosophical theology and Schelling’s with an objectivistic
(product-based) philosophy of art only underlines the difference of
their starting points. Furthermore, each reasons according to a
defensible philosophical methodology—Fichte insisting, “No freedom
[at the top], no ethics [in the end]” (SW II, 150), Schelling that the
philosopher must abstract from subjectivity and adopt an impersonal
or objective stance to attain the absolute.
In other respects, Fichte’s line of reasoning is superior to
Schelling’s: he fully engages with the philosophical currents of
modernity, from Descartes’s universal doubt to Reinhold’s
Elementary Philosophy, and is willing to get a consistent system of
transcendental idealism from Kant’s writings by subordinating his
reading of the first and third Critiques to the “primacy of the practical”
announced in the second; Schelling, who can be credited with being no
mere child of his time, is in some way not a “modern,” for he is quite
willing to read Plato through the lens of Kant and Kant through the
eyes of Plato. It is to Fichte’s advantage that the Vocation advances its
moral theology in the light of an essentially skeptical critique of the
prospects of any defensible theory of cognition, whether realistic
(Spinoza) or critical (Kant/Reinhold). Further, the immediacy of the
moral or agent perspective that Fichte adopts and its resistance to
being explained or explained away, give him a prima facie advantage—
I can act if I think I can act, but if I am hobbled by a Rube Goldberg
account of cognition (Kant’s first critique) or neo-Darwinian
explanation of the ethical, I will have to wonder if I can act when I
want to act.
Who or what is to decide the issue? As recently as Wilfred
Sellars’s “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” the problem
was deemed insoluble—there is simply no deciding between the
cognitive stance (secured in and by empirical science) and the
manifest image (the human as actor and bearer of social and moral
responsibility).22 Yet technology proceeds on the inverse maxim of
morality: if the latter announces, “Ought implies can,” the former is
guided by “Can implies ought.” If in fact technologies of neurological or
genetic intervention succeed in realizing the clumsy totalitarian goal of
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re-educating political and social “deviants” to “correct views” and
social conformity, what is to prevent the practical perspective from
atrophying and losing its self-claimed unique status in the human
person as the sole determiner of “good” acts or acceptable behavior.
Perhaps this is but a fanciful flight to an as yet unrealized and wholly
unrealizable future, but if we are in the long run biologically and
ecologically crafted to succeed (continue) rather than to sprout the
Kantian “holy will,” what will happen when the “moral compass”
becomes a museum piece like the astrolabe or magnetic compass?
Though I am personally horrified at the prospect of having to
surrender my driver’s license because of failing eyesight, faulty
judgment, and generally slowed synaptic response, the day of
governance by microchip is at hand. At this writing, automobiles are
being readied for the market that depend on circuitry and global
positioning systems to transport all of us far more safely and efficiently
than the confluence of individual agents’ fallible but “free” decisions—
now seen to result sometimes in five-day traffic jams.
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